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Abstract. Choice-based letting (CBL) has been widely introduced to the social housing 
sector in England to give applicants more freedom in where they live. Concerns have 
been expressed that giving people more choice in residential locations has the potential to 
increase neighbourhood segregation. It has also been argued that a lack of real choice, 
not self-segregation, might be a cause of social and ethnic segregation. In social housing 
real choice might not be available and the most vulnerable are likely to access the easiest 
housing options: often in deprived and segregated neighbourhoods. This paper analyses 
the probability that households applying for social housing using different allocation 
systems end up in deprived or ethnically concentration neighbourhoods. Using unique 
data representing lettings made in the social housing sector in England we show that 
ethnic minorities, and especially those using CBL, are the most likely to end up in 
deprived and ethnic concentration neighbourhoods.  
 
Keywords: Social Housing, Housing Allocation, Choice Based Letting, Ethnicity, 
Neighbourhood, Segregation 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Neighbourhood segregation along ethnic and socio-economic lines is often regarded as a 
problem potentially leading to disadvantage for individuals and hindering the 
development of a sustainable multicultural society (Pawson & Kintrea, 2002; Dekker & 
Rowlands, 2005). Segregation has been blamed for the 2001 riots in several cities in the 
North of England (Denham, 2001). A report by the Independent Review Team (2001) 
criticised the role played by housing policy and housing provision in creating segregated 
communities noting that, in many cases, the segregation was self enforced with ethnic 
minorities choosing to live in communities comprised predominantly of people of the 
same ethnicity. To avoid a repeat of the 2001 riots – and to avoid a range of other 
potential negative side-effects of segregation – the UK government promoted the creation 
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of ethnically and socio-economically mixed neighbourhoods (DETR, 2000a; ODPM, 
2005). 
 Around the time of the riots, the Housing Green Paper, Quality and Choice: A 
decent home for all (DETR, 2000b) placed choice for social renters at the centre of 
British social housing policy. Based on the Green Paper, choice-based letting (CBL) was 
introduced as a means of access for those looking to rent in the public sector. CBL was 
designed to empower people in social housing to make decisions over how and where 
they live, and allows applicants to bid on properties in neighbourhoods of their ‘choice’ 
instead of being allocated to a dwelling by a housing officer (Kullberg, 1997; 2002; 
DETR, 2000b, Brown & Yates, 2005; Brown & King, 2005). The objectives of policies 
to create socially mixed neighbourhoods and policies to give people more choice on the 
housing market are potentially contradictory. 
Concerns have been expressed that CBL could lead to higher levels of 
segregation, or at least will help to sustain current levels of segregation (Van Ham & 
Manley, 2009). It is well established that there are differences between ethnic groups in 
the desired ethnic mix of the neighbourhoods in which they live and these (sometimes 
small) differences can lead to marked patterns of ethnic segregation (Schelling, 1969, 
1971; see Clark, 1991 for the US; Van Ham & Feijten, 2008 for the Netherlands). So 
giving people more choice in residential locations under CBL has the potential to 
increase neighbourhood segregation. The government report Monitoring the Longer Term 
Impact of Choice Based Lettings (Pawson et al., 2006) concluded that there is no 
evidence that CBL had resulted in greater ethnic segregation. However, Pawson and 
Watkins (2007) state that the above conclusion possibly does not reflect experiences of 
all British social landlords using CBL. 
Paradoxically, it has also been argued that a lack of real choice under CBL, and 
not self-segregation, might be a cause of (sustained) social and ethnic segregation in 
neighbourhoods (Pawson & Watkins, 2007). Having real choice means being able to 
select a preferred option from a set of distinctive alternatives. In social housing, a safety 
net for those without options, distinctive alternatives might not be available. The most 
vulnerable housing applicants with urgent or specific housing needs are likely to use CBL 
to go for the easiest-to-get dwellings in the least desirable areas: often deprived and 
ethnically segregated neighbourhoods. Those with more time on their hands will have the 
opportunity to wait until they can secure a more desirable property. 
One of the problems of CBL is that the number of desirable dwellings in desirable 
neighbourhoods is limited and demand for dwellings is high in most areas. So although 
people are given some degree of choice, also under CBL there will be ‘winners’ and 
‘losers’ with households ending up in the least desirable neighbourhoods (Van Ham & 
Manley, 2009). Although consumer responses to the recently introduced CBL systems 
have been investigated (Kullberg, 2002) we know relatively little about CBL outcomes in 
terms of their spatial or distributional effects (Pawson & Watkins, 2007). This paper will 
contribute to our knowledge of mechanisms behind neighbourhood segregation in three 
ways. First, we will focus on the role of social housing allocation systems, and 
specifically on the role of CBL, in neighbourhood sorting. We will investigate whether 
different allocation systems lead to different neighbourhood outcomes for different ethnic 
groups. Second, we will take a dynamic approach by analysing unique flow data on 
nearly all new lettings in the social housing sector in England in the 1999/2000 and 
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2008/2009 financial years. We will compare patterns of neighbourhood sorting for 
lettings made by the same social landlords before and after CBL was introduced. In 
addition, we will investigate for the most recent financial year whether lettings made 
using CBL lead to different patterns of neighbourhood sorting compared to the old 
housing allocation systems. Third, we will study both the ethnic and socio-economic 
dimensions of destination neighbourhoods as this will give us more insight in the various 
mechanisms that might underlie household neighbourhood ‘choices’. It can be argued 
that if CBL is enabling the expression of genuine choice, it is unlikely that any 
households would choose to live in the most deprived neighbourhoods (see for instance 
Marsh et al., 2005). However, if certain deprived ethnic concentration neighbourhoods 
offer ethnically specific amenities such neighbourhoods might still be attractive to live in 
for certain groups (Pawson et al., 2006; see also Bowes et al., 1997). 
 
 
Background and literature review 
 
Segregation and neighbourhood choice 
The proportion of ethnic minorities in the overall population in England was around 9 
percent at the time of the 2001 Census. Ethnic minorities are generally concentrated in 
large urban areas compared to rural areas. Ethnic minorities are also over represented in 
social housing. On average, 17 percent of the white population in England lives in social 
housing and 27 percent of the ethnic minority population lives in social housing (SEH, 
2007). As mentioned in the introduction, the spatial concentration of ethnic minorities is 
of great concern to the British Government. Concerns have also been expressed about the 
concentration of ethnic minorities in social housing – which is not independent from the 
spatial concentration concerns – which suggests that ethnic minorities are less able than 
others to satisfy their housing needs in the market (Independent Review Team, 2001; 
Commission for Racial Equality, 1990; 2004; Cabinet Office, 2003; Home Office 2001).  
The severity and the scale of both ethnic and socio-economic spatial separation in 
England, and whether or not it should be termed ‘segregation’ have been debated 
extensively. Using 1991 Census data for the United Kingdom, Champion (1996) reported 
that in England ethnic minorities are spatially dispersed and that areas with the highest 
concentrations of ethnic minorities do not match the image of racialised ‘ghettos’ as 
known in the USA (see also Peach, 1996; Johnston et al., 2002). In a more recent analysis 
using the 2001 Census, the national trend of dispersion of ethnic minorities, albeit with 
pockets of ethnic concentrations, was confirmed by Johnston (2006, p.988). In another 
study using both 1991 and 2001 Census data Dorling and Rees (2003) suggested that 
there was evidence at the local authority level of increasing segregation between the 
white majority and ethnic minorities. Using proxy measures, such as access to bathrooms 
and central heating as indicators of socio-economic status, Dorling and Rees (2003) also 
point to growing economic segregation, especially between housing tenure groups. They 
state: “[t]o be growing up in a council house now marks a household out geographically 
far more than it did a decade ago” (p.1301). 
It is clear from the literature that the selective mobility of residents into and out of 
neighbourhoods has the potential to create and reinforce patterns of deprivation and 
segregation (Bailey & Livingstone, 2008; Van Ham & Feijten, 2008; Feijten & Van Ham, 
 4 
2009; Van Ham & Clark, 2009). Individual preferences related to the ethnic composition 
of the neighbourhood population, and the consequent moving behaviour of these 
individuals, can cumulate in aggregate to highly segregated neighbourhoods (Schelling, 
1969, 1971; see also Clark, 1992; Emerson et al., 2001; Ihlanfeldt and Scafidi, 2002; 
Ionnides and Zabel, 2003). Alternatively, the ‘racial proxy hypothesis’ argues that 
members of the majority population leave ethnic concentration neighbourhoods not 
because they have an aversion to living near minority group members per se, but because 
these neighbourhoods are often deprived (Taub et al., 1984; Clark, 1992; Harris, 1999; 
Crowder, 2000). This is partly because some ethnic minority groups are more likely to be 
unemployed and poor, and partly because ethnic minorities often end up in poor, 
deprived and unstable neighbourhoods as a result of limited choice on the housing 
market. 
 Simpson (2004) has highlighted that to fully understand apparent neighbourhood 
segregation it is necessary to move beyond issues of selective migration. Using 
demographic data for Bradford, Simpson (2004) reported that significant changes in the 
relative distribution of the South Asian community, relative to rest of the population, was 
caused by natural population growth. Bradford was one of the cities in the North of 
England that experienced riots during the summer of 2001, and it is notable that 
Simpson’s conclusion on the causes of segregation was at odds with the government 
report which focussed on self-segregation of ethnic minorities through their residential 
choices (Independent Review Team, 2001). The same report does not acknowledge that 
‘self-segregation’ is often rooted in poverty and deprivation, and not necessarily the 
result of real choice (Hickman and Robinson, 2006; Robinson, 2005). 
 
Housing ‘choice’ and segregation 
The above discussion of household preferences with regard to the ethnic composition of 
their neighbourhood and subsequent selective mobility into and out of neighbourhoods is 
only relevant when households can exercise some level of choice in their housing 
behaviour. This is the case (to some extent) in the owner-occupied market, but much less 
so in the social housing sector. Over the last 30 years, the social housing sector in 
England has undergone major structural changes, eroding the choice set of social housing 
available. In 1981, 31 percent of all households in England lived in social housing and by 
2007 this figure had fallen to 18 percent (SEH, 2007). In under three decades, the social 
housing sector has been redefined from a tenure of destination (Hickman and Robinson, 
2006) into a tenure of last resort, to be accessed only when all other housing options have 
been exhausted by those unable to afford housing by other means (Taylor, 1998). 
Historically low investment in the building of new social housing, combined with the 
sales of millions of social housing units to sitting tenants under the right-to-buy (Jones 
and Murie, 2006) has severely depleted the social sector. The right-to-buy was mainly 
used to purchase the most desirable dwellings in the most desirable neighbourhoods, 
resulting on the residualization of the remaining social housing stock. 
Prior to 2001, social housing in England was exclusively allocated using waiting 
lists. Housing needs and the priority levels of applicants were assessed using points or 
category based systems (Pawson & Watkins, 2007). Housing officers used the outcome 
of the assessment to match households with available properties. Households could refuse 
an offer made, but this usually led to penalties such as temporary suspension from the 
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housing waiting list (Pawson & Watkins, 2007) or exclusion through one-offer-only 
policies (Pawson & Kintrea, 2002). 
Housing allocation practices from as far back as the 1950s have been linked to 
current patterns of ethnic segregation. It was repeatedly shown that housing officers 
intentionally and unintentionally promoted segregated outcomes by discriminating 
applicants based on ethnicity and socio-economic background and allocated households 
to dwellings and neighbourhoods based on whether they ‘deserved’ a dwelling, or were 
‘suitable’ for a neighbourhood (Duke, 1970; Simpson, 1981; Henderson & Karn, 1984; 
Clapham & Kintrea, 1984; Malpass & Murie, 1994; Peach, 1996; Somerville, 2001; Sarre 
et al., 1989). There is no recent research providing evidence of discriminatory practices, 
so it is fair to assume that these practices have been eliminated. However, also the 
categorisations used in needs-based assessments as included in the 1996 Housing Act 
have been accused of reflecting “household types that may be considered especially 
‘deserving’” (Fitzpatrick & Pawson, 2006, p.180). As a result of these categorisations, 
allocation practices using needs based assessment have the propensity to reproduce the 
geographic concentration of poverty (Fitzpatrick & Pawson, 2006). 
In 2001 CBL was introduced to empower people in social housing to make 
decisions over how and where they live (DETR, 2000b, Brown & Yates, 2005; Brown & 
King, 2005). The model for CBL came from the ‘advert’ or ‘supply’ model developed in 
the late 1980s in the city of Delft in the Netherlands (Kullberg, 1997; 2002). The system 
was designed to “open up the letting of social housing” and operates by enabling eligible 
households to bid on a range of properties (Pawson et al., 2006, p.5). Eligibility is 
determined using a variety of different forms of ‘currency’ – such as points and waiting 
time or housing need bands – to rank bidders (Marsh et al., 2004). Also within the CBL 
framework, social landlords still have the legal obligation to operate a needs-based 
allocation system. By introducing a quasi-market system into social housing allocation it 
was hoped that demand would be stimulated in harder to let areas (Marsh, 2004) and that 
households would access properties and locations that were more suitable to their needs 
and reflected the kind of places in which they would like to live, theoretically 
encouraging households to become stakeholders in their neighbourhoods. The 
Department of Communities and Local Government, the Government department 
responsible for social housing policy in England aims to have CBL available to all 
housing applicants by 2010. Letting data for the 2008/9 financial year as used in this 
study, shows that CBL is used for 30 percent of all lettings 
As discussed in the introduction, one of the possible negative side effects of CBL 
is that it might lead to segregation, or at least sustain current levels of segregation, as 
people are able to choose where to live based on ethnic preferences in line with 
Schelling’s (1969, 1971) hypothesis, or because they prefer to live in neighbourhoods 
with ethnic specific amenities. It has also been argued that a lack of real choice in CBL, 
and not self-segregation, might also be a cause of social and ethnic segregation in 
neighbourhoods (Pawson & Watkins, 2007; see also Van Ham & Manley, 2009). Having 
real choice means being able to select a preferred option from distinctive alternatives. In 
social housing, a safety net for those without options, distinctive alternatives might not be 
available. Research by Marsh and colleagues (2004) showed that tenants who accessed 
social housing using CBL, identified a lack of choice as a real problem. Tenants stated 
that they frequently ended up bidding on properties and neighbourhoods they deemed to 
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be of sub-standard quality. An essential prerequisite for real choice is information 
(knowledge) about alternatives (see Elster, 1999 as in Brown & King, 2005). Some social 
housing applicants using CBL will have more and better information than others, either 
as a result of English language skills (Pawson et al., 2006), skills in using the CBL 
system, time to assess alternatives, or greater knowledge about the local housing market 
and neighbourhoods in their choice set. Ultimately, this will bias the allocation system in 
their favour (Brown & King, 2005). Research in the Netherlands showed that applicants 
with low incomes and those from ethnic minority groups (often overlapping groups) were 
more likely to lack understanding of the CBL system and therefore fared less well in 
terms of housing outcomes (Kullberg, 2002). 
CBL might also lead to segregation because those with urgent housing needs, but 
without priority status, use their choice to bid on the easiest-to-get dwellings which 
increases the likelihood to be accommodated in a less desirable area (Van Ham & 
Manley, 2009). Fitzpatrick and Pawson noted that “the importance of the ‘ability to wait’ 
in driving spatial polarisation is germane to the potential impact of the ‘choice’ agenda” 
(2006 p.172). This is especially true as in cases where households with similar needs bid 
on the same property, waiting time is often used as a means to allocate the dwelling to the 
household with the longest waiting time. As a result of the above, concerns have been 
expressed that CBL might be detrimental to the interests of already disadvantaged groups 
(Pawson & Watkins, 2007). Ethnic minorities may end up in ethnic concentration 
neighbourhoods, and especially deprived ethnic concentration neighbourhoods, not as a 
result of choice, but as a result of a lack of choice (Van Ham & Manley, 2009). 
To date, work assessing the impact of CBL on segregation has largely focussed on 
changes in the level of segregation in the neighbourhoods affected. Work for the 
Department of Communities and Local Government (Pawson et al., 2006), and extended 
in Pawson and Watkins (2007), used a number of case studies from social housing estates 
and concluded that “there is no evidence that [CBL] has resulted in more ethnically 
polarized patterns of letting  than those arising from previous lettings systems where 
decisions on which properties to offer to which applications were largely in the hands or 
landlord staff” (Pawson et al., 2006, p.14; see also Pawson & Watkins, 2007). In terms of 
ethnic mix in communities Pawson and colleagues found that “[m]any applicants 
preferred ethnically mixed areas, rather than areas where one ethnicity predominated, 
which suggests that diffusion is more likely than segregation under CBL” (2006, p.183). 
In this study we argue that as neighbourhoods are dynamic environments with 
households moving in and out all the time, some process of neighbourhood sorting must 
be in place even when overall levels of segregation to stay the same (Van Ham & 
Manley, 2009). Sorting mechanisms within previous letting systems might simply have 
been replaced by (self) selection mechanisms within the CBL system. 
 
 
Data and Methods 
 
The data used in this study were assembled from (LA)COntinuous REcording which 
records information on the characteristics of both the household and the dwelling each 
time social unit is let in England. We used two approaches to model the effect of social 
housing allocation systems on neighbourhood sorting. Each of these approaches has 
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shortcomings, but we believe that in combination they provide a robust insight into the 
effects of housing allocation systems. 
 In the first approach we compared patterns of neighbourhood sorting for lettings 
made by the same social landlords before and after the introduction of CBL. We 
compared lettings from the CORE Housing Association data for the financial years 
1999/2000 and 2008/9. The dataset was restricted to include only lettings by Housing 
Associations which made more than 90% of their lettings through CBL in 2008/9 and for 
which we could also identify lettings in 1999/2000. We selected lettings made by the 
same Housing Associations in two time periods, in an attempt to keep housing stock and 
neighbourhood characteristics constant over time. We acknowledge that there will have 
been substantial changes in the structure of Housing Associations during the 8 years 
through the processes of transfers, mergers and acquisitions which alter the staffing 
composition, management structures and policies practiced by the associations. 
Nevertheless, we feel that the comparability of the stock is sufficient for the analysis we 
wish to conduct, especially when combined with the second approach outlined below.  To 
enhance comparability, only lettings made in urban areas were selected. Urban areas were 
identified using the Office of National Statistics urban – rural classification system (ONS, 
2010). In practice the urban restriction did not reduce the data substantially as most CBLs 
were made in urban areas. The first dataset had a usable set of 26,398 lettings. 
 In the second approach we compared patterns of neighbourhood sorting for 
lettings made using CBL and traditional allocation methods in the 2008/9 financial year 
only. We combined data on lettings by Housing Associations and Local Authorities, 
effectively creating a census of lettings made in 2008/9 (CORE, 2009). The data is 
complete for 92% of Local Authorities (CHR, 2009) and for all Housing Associations 
with more than 250 units or 250 bed spaces in England. Social landlords with less than 
250 units or bed spaces or not registered with the Housing Corporation but who are 
affiliated to the National Housing Federation are invited to complete CORE logs. CORE 
was launched in 1989 and around 600 Housing Associations are now recording more than 
125,000 general needs lettings, 90,000 supported housing lettings and 16,000 sales per 
year. LACORE, recording lettings made by Local Authorities, was started in 2004 and 
although the data is not complete, we considered it to be important to include LACORE 
data in the analysis so the data would be representative of most of the social housing 
sector. For 2008/9 LACORE comprised of almost 96,000 Supported Housing and 
General Needs lettings. In total the combined dataset provided us with detailed 
information on 227,668 useable lettings. 
The CORE data from 1999/2000 and 2008/9 and LACORE data from 2008/9 
include low-level geocoding recording the location of the dwelling which allows linking 
neighbourhood characteristics to individual lettings. We defined neighbourhoods using 
the administrative units Super Output Areas (SOAs). Whilst we acknowledge the 
potential fallacies associated with using administrative to describe neighbourhoods (see 
Galster, 2001), SOAs were designed in conjunction with extensive external consultation 
to be of a similar scale to the most commonly perceived neighbourhood geography, and 
equate on average to areas of 1,500 people. Neighbourhood information was derived 
from two data sources: the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) for England (ODPM, 
2007) and the 2001 Census for the percentage of ethnic minorities in neighbourhoods. 
The first year for which the IMD data is available at the SOA level is 2004, As a result, 
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the IMD 2004 was linked to the 1999/200 data and the IMD 2007 to the 2008/9 data. 
Although the dates of the IMDs are not identical to the dates of the lettings, it is valid to 
use deprivation information from different time periods as deprivation is largely static 
over time (see Meen et al., 2007)  
Instead of directly using the national absolute measures of neighbourhood 
deprivation and ethnicity we created bespoke relative measures for local housing markets. 
Given that most households search locally, not nationally, for housing, we chose to create 
variables reflecting the relative position of a neighbourhood in the local housing market. 
We explored various ways to make local housing markets operational such as Local 
Authorities (LA), Travel to Work Areas (TTWA), and Government Office Regions 
(GOR). We decided that Travel to Work Areas come closest to what we see as local 
housing markets  as they are defined so that 75% of those living in the area also work in 
the area and 75% of those working in the area also live in the area (Coombes & 
Raybould, 2004). Super Output Areas nest conterminously within Travel to Work Areas. 
Using the scores for the Index of Multiple Deprivation we identified the 20 
percent most deprived Super Output Areas in each Travel to Work Area. Using the 
percentage of ethnic minorities in each Super Output Areas we identified the 20 percent 
neighbourhoods with the highest percentage of ethnic minorities in each Travel to Work 
Area. We then used these bespoke relative measures of neighbourhood deprivation and 
ethnicity to code our dependent variable (type of destination neighbourhood) into four 
categories: (1) non-deprived and non-ethnic concentration neighbourhoods; (2) deprived 
but non-ethnic concentration neighbourhoods; (3) non-deprived but ethnic concentration 
neighbourhoods, and; (4) deprived and ethnic concentration neighbourhoods. The 
distribution of lettings according to destination neighbourhood type can be found in Table 
1. These four categories are based on research which shows that many people see 
deprived neighbourhoods and ethnic concentration neighbourhoods as less desirable 
(Harris, 1999; Bolt et al., 2008). We believe that our four types of neighbourhoods are a 
proxy for neighbourhood desirability in local housing markets, where the first type of 
neighbourhood is more desirable than the other three types (although there is no 
particular order between types two, three or four). 
 
<Table 1 here please> 
 
Given that we have an outcome variable with four mutually exclusive categories 
we used multinomial logistic regression to model destination neighbourhoods. Because 
the dataset includes multiple lettings within each housing market, the basic assumption of 
independence of observations required for standard logistic regression is violated. We 
have therefore used a multilevel multinomial logistic regression model (with fixed 
slopes) using the data analysis software STATA with the optional GLLAMM module 
(Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008). Level 1 in our model represents individual 
households (or lettings made to individual households) and level 2 represents the local 
housing market in the form of Travel to Work Areas. The crucial part of the multilevel 
model structure is the areal level variance term, which enabled us to discuss the amount 
of variation explained by local housing market structures compared to the amount of 
variation explained by individual level characteristics. 
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 Most independent variables included in the model were coded as dummies. Ethnic 
minority households were defined as households where the head does not belong to any 
of the following groups: White, White Irish or White Other. Ethnic minorities were coded 
as 1 and others were coded as 0. Employment status was measured in three categories: 
employed (reference category), unemployed, and other. Household composition was 
measured in 5 categories: single, single parent, two adult household with children, two 
adults without children (reference category), and other households. Dummy variables 
were created for lettings in the Supported Housing sector, lettings to new households 
entering the social sector from other tenures (compared to lettings made to households 
within the social sector), lettings made to households entering new stock (compared to 
household entering existing stock), and lettings made to households using CBL. Because 
CBL is more common in the Local Authority sector than in Housing Association 
properties, a dummy for households renting Local Authority dwellings (opposed to 
renting through a Housing Association) was included. Age of the head of household was 
measured in years, and included as a continuous variable. The number of bedrooms in the 
property was not available for all Supported Housing properties. For the rentals where 
this information was missing the average number of bedrooms was imputed which gives 
unbiased estimates (see Cohen & Cohen, 1975, chapter 7). The numerical distributions 
for the variables are described in table 1. 
Housing market areas differ largely in the types of neighbourhoods on ‘offer’ and 
we had to control our models for this fact. In local housing markets with a high 
percentage of social housing in deprived neighbourhoods, social housing applicants are 
more likely to end up in a deprived neighbourhood. Likewise, in local housing markets 
with a high percentage of ethnic minorities, social housing applicants are more likely to 
end up in an ethnic concentration neighbourhood. To control for structural differences 
between local housing markets we added two more variables to our models: the 
proportion of lettings made across the housing market in deprived and ethnic 
neighbourhoods. 
 
 
Results 
 
Table 2 shows the results of a multilevel multinomial regression model of neighbourhood 
outcomes in which we compare neighbourhood outcomes for lettings made in the 
financial year 1999/2000 (before CBL was introduced) with the outcomes of lettings 
made in the  financial year 2008/9 (after CBL was introduced). As outlined in the data 
and methods section, for comparability we selected lettings made by the same Housing 
Associations in both periods. This design allows us to gain insight into the impact of 
introducing CBL on neighbourhood sorting. 
 The reference category in Table 2 consists of non-deprived, non-ethnic 
concentration neighbourhoods. The results show that ethnic minorities are 1.3 times more 
likely than others to rent a dwelling in a deprived neighbourhoods; 2.6 times more likely 
to rent a dwelling in an ethnic concentration neighbourhood; and 3.1 times more likely to 
rent a dwelling in a deprived ethnic concentration neighbourhood. Those who rented a 
dwelling in 2008/9 (after the introduction of CBL) were more likely to end up in a 
deprived neighbourhood or an ethnic concentration neighbourhood, but not more or less 
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likely to enter a deprived and ethnic concentration neighbourhood compared to the 
reference category. The interaction effect between the ethnicity dummy and the CBL 
dummy shows that ethnic minorities using CBL are the most likely to rent a dwelling in 
deprived neighbourhoods, ethnic concentration neighbourhoods and deprived ethnic 
concentration neighbourhoods. A full overview of the effects will be given at the end of 
this section.   
 
<Table 2 here please> 
 
The model in Table 2 also contains a set of additional control variables which will only 
be discussed briefly here. The effects of the control variables reflect a combinations of 
factors such as the housing allocation practices of social housing providers, the structure 
of the local housing market, and a limited degree of choice (even under the old allocation 
system). The results show that the older the head of the household, the less likely it is that 
the household is allocated (or has chosen) a dwelling in any of the deprived or ethnic 
concentration neighbourhoods. The age effect might be a proxy for the time households 
have been on a waiting list. The longer the waiting time, the more likely it is that a 
household gets the dwelling of their choice in a more desirable neighbourhood. 
Alternatively, the age effect might reflect differences in the composition in housing stock 
between neighbourhoods where housing suitable for older applicants might be more 
likely to be located in non-deprived and non-ethnic concentration neighbourhoods. 
Households with children are the least likely of all household types to move into or 
within any of the deprived or ethnic concentration neighbourhoods. These results are in 
line with those found by Bolt and colleagues (2008) who demonstrated that households 
with children tend to avoid areas with negative reputations, which would include 
deprived and ethnic concentration areas (see Permentier et al., 2008 on neighbourhood 
reputations). Consistently, single person households (without children) and other 
household types are the most likely to rent a dwelling in any of the three deprived or 
ethnic concentration neighbourhood types. 
Non-working households (including households where the head is retired or 
providing care) are more likely than working households to enter deprived 
neighbourhoods. Households entering social housing from other tenures, either owner 
occupation or private renting (labelled new tenants), are more likely to enter deprived 
neighbourhoods than existing tenants. This is not surprising as it might be assumed that 
new entrants to the social housing sector are more likely to have pressing housing needs, 
because of the loss of their previous accommodation, than those already in the sector who 
normally only move to improve their current housing situation. Those who move into 
larger dwellings (measured by the number of bedrooms in the property) are slightly more 
likely to rent in deprived neighbourhoods and less likely to rent in ethnically concentrated 
neighbourhoods. Finally we controlled for some local housing market characteristics. We 
included a London dummy and we controlled for the composition of neighbourhoods in 
the local housing market to take into account regional differences in housing market 
structures. The higher the percentage of lettings in the local housing market made in the 
20 percent most deprived neighbourhoods (Super Output Areas), the more likely that a 
social housing applicant ends up in a deprived neighbourhood. The higher the percentage 
of lettings in the local housing market made in the 20 percent most ethically concentrated 
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neighbourhoods, the more likely that a social housing applicant ends up in an ethnic-
concentration neighbourhood. The direction of these two local housing market effects is 
in line with our expectations. 
Table 3 reports the results of a multilevel multinomial regression model of 
neighbourhood outcomes for the full set of lettings from 2008/9. In this model we 
compare neighbourhood outcomes of CBL and traditional letting practices in the same 
financial year allowing us to compare the outcomes of the different letting mechanisms. 
As in the previous table, the reference category consists of non-deprived, non-ethnic 
concentration neighbourhoods. The results show that ethnic minorities are more likely 
than others to rent a dwelling in deprived neighbourhoods, ethnic concentration 
neighbourhoods and deprived and ethnic concentrated neighbourhoods. Those who rented 
their dwelling using CBL are more likely to end up in a deprived or ethnic concentration 
neighbourhood than those who rented their dwelling using traditional allocation 
mechanisms. The interaction effect between the ethnicity dummy and the CBL dummy 
shows that ethnic minorities using CBL are the most likely to end up in deprived and 
ethnic concentration neighbourhoods. Table 3 also reports the effects of a range of 
control variables which show roughly similar results to those found in the model in Table 
2. 
 
<Table 3 here please> 
 
Table 4 shows the overall effects of the ethnicity dummy, the CBL dummy and the 
interaction effects for the models as presented in Tables 2 and 3. Although different 
modelling approaches were used, the results are very similar. In both approaches ethnic 
minorities are consistently more likely to enter not only neighbourhoods with 
concentrations of other ethnic minorities but also neighbourhoods that have a high level 
of deprivation. Both approaches also show that ethnic minorities using CBL are far more 
likely than others (including ethnic minorities using the older allocation mechanisms) to 
rent a dwelling in deprived neighbourhoods, ethnic concentration neighbourhoods and 
especially deprived ethnic concentration neighbourhoods. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Using unique data on nearly all new lettings in the social housing sector in England from 
both the 1999/2000 and 2008/9 financial years we analysed whether CBL leads to 
different types of destination neighbourhoods compared to the old allocation systems and 
whether CBL leads to different outcomes for ethnic minorities compared to other groups. 
As discussed, we used two different modelling approaches and we acknowledge that both 
modelling approaches have shortcomings (as discussed in the data and methods section). 
However, given that both approaches lead to the same conclusions we are confident that 
the results are robust. 
The first conclusion is that among those who do not use CBL, ethnic minorities 
are far more likely than non-ethnic minorities to end up in deprived and especially ethnic-
concentration neighbourhoods. This indicates that the old social housing allocation 
system where housing officers make allocation decisions, still plays an important role in 
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creating or sustaining segregated neighbourhoods. This is an important finding. The 
underlying mechanisms might be diverse: self-selection as a result of the limited 
possibility of rejecting a dwelling offered under the old allocation system; allocation 
practices of social landlords; and local housing market and population structures. The 
second conclusion is that those who rent their dwelling through CBL (both non-minority 
and ethnic minority households) are more likely to end up in a deprived neighbourhood 
(and to a lesser extent in an ethnic-concentration neighbourhood) than those who get their 
dwelling using the older allocation systems. This is most likely an indication that CBL is 
mainly used by social landlords with a lot of stock in deprived neighbourhoods, although 
we partially controlled for this in our first modelling approach by selecting lettings from 
the same social landlords in both years. If in a local housing market the majority of 
dwellings on offer using CBL is located in deprived neighbourhoods, then the majority of 
tenants using CBL will end up in a deprived neighbourhood. We attempted to control for 
local housing market structures, but we acknowledge that these variables do not catch all 
differences between local housing markets. 
The third conclusion is that ethnic minorities renting through CBL are much more 
likely to end up in ethnic concentration neighbourhoods than any other group. This could 
be seen as a positive result of choice: ethnic minorities choosing to live in 
neighbourhoods with other ethnic minorities. However, it is interesting that ethnic 
minorities using CBL are also the most likely to end up in deprived and deprived ethnic-
concentration neighbourhoods. As it is unlikely that people ‘choose’ to live in deprived 
neighbourhoods, this finding gives some support to the alternative explanation that ethnic 
minorities using CBL end up in (or move within) less desirable neighbourhoods not 
because of choice, but because of a lack of real choice. We do acknowledge that some of 
these deprived neighbourhoods will offer ethnic specific amenities which might make 
them attractive for some groups. Some ethnic minority groups might choose to live in 
certain deprived neighbourhoods because of the importance of kinship, cultural or 
infrastructural ties, which are more important in choosing a neighbourhood than the 
desire to live in less deprived neighbourhoods (see for example Bowes et al., 2007). 
Our overall conclusion is that both CBL and the old allocation mechanism sort 
ethnic minorities into ethnic concentration neighbourhoods. Ethnic minorities renting 
through CBL are the most likely to end up in ethnic concentration neighbourhoods. We 
did not investigate whether the level of segregation in neighbourhoods changed after the 
introduction of CBL, but our analyses at least show that CBL leads to selective sorting.  
The fact that ethnic minorities using CBL are not only the most likely to end up in ethnic 
concentration neighbourhoods, but also in deprived neighbourhoods suggests that the 
selective sorting is not only a result of choice and self-segregation, but also a result of a 
lack of real choice. Part of this lack of real choice seems to be caused by social landlords 
using CBL in the most deprived neighbourhoods and the most difficult to let stock. When 
having real choice means being able to select a preferred option from distinctive 
alternatives, CBL does not offer real choice. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics of variables used 
Data set used 2008/2009 1999/2000 & 2008/9  
Number of cases 227,668 26,398 
   
Dependent variable (4 types of destination neighbourhoods)   
  Non-deprived non-ethnic concentration (reference) 103,369 10,456 
  Deprived but non-ethnic concentration 21,708 7,770 
  Non-deprived but ethnic concentration 22,058 2,308 
  Deprived and ethic concentration 80,533 5,864 
   
Independent variables   
Choice-based letting (ref = other lettings) 83,704 N/A 
Ethnic Minority household (ref = not ethnic minority) 31,608 4,642 
Letting made in 2008/9 (ref = lettings in 1999/2000) N/A 16,920 
Household type   
  Single (reference) 20,664 2,542 
  Single Parent 137,875 11,237 
  Couple without Children (reference) 34,688 6,060 
  Couple with Children 23,453 4,048 
  Other Household 10,988 1,737 
Economic Activity   
  Employed (reference) 41,198 7,720 
  Unemployed  44,608 4,883 
  Other Activity  137,862 13,825 
New Tenant (ref = existing tenant) 82,787 10.267 
New Let (ref = relet) 23,999 12,150 
Supported Housing (ref = not Supported Housing) 89,749 N/A 
Local Authority letting (ref is Housing Association) 54,230 N/A 
London (ref = rest of England) 26,471 3,385 
 Average Values 
Age 41.94 39.05 
Number of bedrooms 1.88 1.89 
Percentage of lettings in the 20% most deprived SOAs in 
local housing market 
44.59 45.79 
Percentage of lettings in the 20% most ethnically 
concentrated SOAs in the local housing market 
44.89 29.50 
Source: Author’s own calculations using CORE and LACORE lettings data 1999/2000 
and 2008/9 (N/A = not applicable to dataset) 
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Table 2: Multilevel Multinomial Regression Model of neighbourhood outcomes (reference group: non-deprived, non-ethnic concentration neighbourhoods) for 
lettings made by urban Housing Associations in both 1999/2000 and 2008/9. 
 Deprived Neighbourhood Ethnic Concentration 
Neighbourhood 
Deprived & Ethnic Concentration 
Neighbourhood  
 
OR Std Err Sig ORa Std Err Sig ORa Std Err Sig 
 Ethnic minority household (ref: non ethnic min) 1.294 0.113 ** 2.630 0.297 ** 3.077 0.225 ** 
 CBL 2008/9 (ref: 1999/2000 non CBL) 1.478 0.086 ** 1.235 0.096 ** 0.904 0.053 
  Interaction Ethnic*CBL 2008/9 1.099 0.123   1.247 0.171   1.655 0.157 ** 
Household level control Variables                 
Age 0.988 0.001 ** 0.997 0.002 * 0.988 0.001 ** 
Household type (ref: couple without children)               
   Single 1.051 0.060 
 
1.113 0.093 
 
1.207 0.082 ** 
   Single Parent 0.762 0.052 ** 0.818 0.083 * 0.867 0.068 
    Couple with children 0.720 0.053 ** 0.892 0.098 
 
1.111 0.093 * 
   Other Household 1.029 0.088   1.126 0.141   1.254 0.120 ** 
Economic Activity (ref: employed)                 
   Unemployed 1.353 0.066 ** 1.027 0.075 
 
1.408 0.075 ** 
   Other Activity 1.163 0.045 ** 1.067 0.061   1.269 0.056 ** 
Letting Information (ref: existing tenant)                   
   New Tenant 1.426 0.066 ** 1.034 0.071 
 
1.319 0.063 ** 
   New let 0.725 0.034 ** 1.133 0.078 
 
1.091 0.052 
 Number of Bedrooms 1.165 0.036 ** 0.965 0.044 
 
1.040 0.035 
 London (ref: rest of England) 0.670 0.108 * 0.506 0.089 ** 1.215 0.196 
 % lettings in 20% most deprived SOAs in LHM 1.043 0.005 ** 0.998 0.006 
 
1.012 0.005 * 
% lettings in 20% most ethnically concentrated 
SOAs in the LHM 0.995 0.004   1.043 0.005 ** 1.062 0.004 ** 
Initial log likelihood  -32,615.1               
Model log likelihood  -29,639.2                
Variance at Level 2 Housing Markets (TTWA) 3.146 0.758  ** 
      
 *=p<0.05; **=p<0.01; aOdds Ratio  
Source: Author’s own calculations using CORE and LACORE lettings data 1999/2000 and 2008/9 
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Table 3: Multilevel Multinomial Regression Model of neighbourhood outcomes (reference group: non-deprived, non-ethnic concentration neighbourhoods) for 
full 2008/9 data. 
 Deprived Neighbourhood Ethnic Concentration 
Neighbourhood 
Deprived & Ethnic 
Concentration 
Neighbourhood  
 
ORa Std Err Sig ORa Std Err Sig ORa Std Err Sig 
Ethnic minority household (ref: non ethnic) 1.594 0.062 ** 1.241 0.038 ** 1.602 0.030 ** 
Choice-based letting (ref: non CBL) 1.192 0.026 ** 1.069 0.020 ** 1.133 0.022 ** 
Interaction Ethnic*CBL 1.160 0.075 * 1.283 0.060 ** 1.474 0.043 ** 
Household level control Variables                 
Age 0.986 0.001 ** 0.991 0.001 ** 0.984 0.001 ** 
Household type (ref: couple without children)               
   Single 1.269 0.041 ** 1.124 0.033 ** 1.217 0.023 ** 
   Single Parent 1.143 0.046 ** 1.043 0.040 
 
1.218 0.029 ** 
   Couple with children 1.050 0.045 
 
1.076 0.045 ** 1.074 0.030 * 
   Other Household 1.354 0.073 ** 1.146 0.054 ** 1.499 0.046 ** 
Economic Activity (ref: employed)                 
   Unemployed 1.279 0.040 ** 1.179 0.033 ** 1.401 0.025 ** 
   Other Activity 1.122 0.027 ** 1.068 0.025 ** 1.112 0.017 ** 
Letting Information (ref: existing tenant)                   
   New Tenant 1.458 0.028 ** 1.458 0.026 ** 1.733 0.021 
    New let 0.963 0.026 
 
0.927 0.028 * 0.968 0.017 ** 
Supported Housing (ref: general needs) 1.036 0.025 ** 1.049 0.024 * 1.232 0.018 ** 
Number of Bedrooms 1.030 0.020 ** 1.025 0.017 
 
1.064 0.012 ** 
Local Authority Letting 1.251 0.030 ** 1.314 0.026 ** 1.094 0.015 ** 
London (ref: rest of England) 1.589 0.099 ** 5.789 0.261 ** 3.130 0.113 ** 
% lettings in 20% most deprived SOAs in LHM 1.104 0.029 ** 0.926 0.002 ** 1.023 0.003 ** 
% lettings in 20% most ethnically concentrated 
SOAs in the LHM 0.909 0.001 ** 1.131 0.001 ** 1.049 0.001 ** 
Initial log likelihood  -279,708.1                
Model log likelihood -207,114.5  
       Variance at Level 2 Housing Markets (TTWA) 2.280 0.089  ** 
      *=p<0.05; **=p<0.01; aOdds Ratio 
Source: Author’s own calculations using CORE and LACORE lettings data 2008/9 
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Table 4: Total effects of ethnicity and choice-based letting, including interaction effect, using odds ratios from models in Tables 2 and 3.  
 Deprived 
Neighbourhood 
Ethnic 
Concentration 
Neighbourhood 
Deprived & Ethnic 
Concentration 
Neighbourhood 
Total effects using data from 1999/2000 and 2008/9 for HA lettings in urban areas (from Table 2) 
White before CBL 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Ethnic before CBL 1.294 2.630 3.077 
White after CBL 1.478 1.235 0.904 
Ethnic after CBL 2.102 4.050 4.604 
Total effects using data from 2008/9 for HA and LA lettings (from Table 3) 
White, not using CBL 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Ethnic minority, not using CBL 1.594 1.241 1.602 
White, using CBL 1.192 1.069 1.133 
Ethnic minority, using CBL 2.204 1.702 2.675 
Source: Author’s own calculations using CORE and LACORE lettings data 1999/2000 & 2008/9 
 
 
